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Two things are worth remembering about an aversive event: What made it happen? What made it cease? If a stimulus pre-
cedes an aversive event, it becomes a signal for threat and will later elicit behavior indicating conditioned fear. However, if
the stimulus is presented upon cessation of the aversive event, it elicits behavior indicating conditioned “relief.” What are
the neuronal bases for such learning? Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in humans we found that a fear-
conditioned stimulus activates amygdala but not striatum, whereas a relief-conditioned stimulus activates striatum but not
amygdala. Correspondingly, acute inactivation of amygdala or of ventral striatum in rats respectively abolished only con-
ditioned fear or only conditioned relief. Thus, the behaviorally opponent memories supported by onset and offset of aver-
sive events engage and require fear and reward networks, respectively. This may explain attraction to stimuli associated with
the cessation of trauma or of panic attacks.
[Supplemental material is available for this article.]
We avoid pain and seek reward. To this end, stimuli can become
associated with these respective salient events (Pavlov 1927). For
example, if a visual stimulus is repeatedly followed by an electric
shock, it will be learned as a threat and will elicit conditioned fear.
A behavioral indicator of such conditioned fear in humans and
other mammals is increased “jumpiness” measured as an in-
creased startle response in the presence of the learned stimulus
(Davis et al. 1993; Fendt and Fanselow 1999; Grillon and Baas
2003). The neuronal basis of such conditioned fear and the crucial
involvement of the amygdala is well examined in humans and ro-
dents (Davis et al. 1993; Lavond and Kim 1993; Davis 1994; Bu¨chel
et al. 1998; LaBar et al. 1998; Fendt and Fanselow 1999; LeDoux
2000; Ashburner and Friston 2003; Hamm and Weike 2005;
Tabbert et al. 2006). Importantly, timing matters for such learn-
ing: Reflecting the predictive nature of the association process,
learning is best if the stimulus shortly precedes the shock (e.g.,
Burman and Gerwitz 2004); this appears to be one of the few uni-
versals across associative learning preparations (Rescorla 1988).
However, what happens if the sequence of events during
training is reversed, i.e., if the to-be-conditioned stimulus is pre-
sented after the shock? In Drosophila, such training establishes
conditioned approach to the stimulus (Tanimoto et al. 2004;
Yarali et al. 2008), indicating that it has been learned as a signal
for “relief” from shock (Solomon 1980; Wagner 1981) or for “re-
spite” (Lohr et al. 2007) or “safety” (Sutton and Barto 1990;
Chang et al. 2003; Leknes et al. 2011) related to the shock-free
safe period within the shock-associated dangerous experimental
context. The relief-based explanation appears more fitting in this
case, because “safety conditioning” should rely on the strength
of the context-shock association (e.g., Chang et al. 2003) and on
the length of the shock-free safe period following the stimulus
(e.g., Moscovitch and LoLordo 1968), but neither of these seems
to be the case in Drosophila (Yarali et al. 2008).
Paralleling the situation in Drosophila, training humans with
first shock and then the conditioned stimulus leads to a decrease
in the amplitude of the startle response in the presence of this
stimulus, in contrast to the increase in startle amplitude observed
after fear conditioning (Andreatta et al. 2010). Thus, one and the
same shock episode presumably leaves two kinds of memory
with opponent implicit valences indicated by startle potentiation
and startle attenuation: conditioned fear and conditioned relief,
respectively. Interestingly, humans explicitly report a negative va-
lence in both cases, despite the opponency of the implicit valenc-
es (Andreatta et al. 2010). Notably, this human paradigm, similar
to the fly paradigm (Tanimoto et al. 2004; Yarali et al. 2008), en-
ables assaying conditioned fear and conditioned relief directly
and within the same behavioral setting. We reasoned that condi-
tioned relief crucially depends on striatal networks, on the one
hand because lesion studies in animals revealed that the attenua-
tion of startle responses due to positively valenced events depends
on striatal circuits (Koch et al. 1996), and on the other hand
because human fMRI studies found evidence that the reduction
(Seymour et al. 2005), the omission (Leknes et al. 2011), or the ter-
mination (Becerra and Borsook 2008) of an expected painful stim-
ulation is associated with activity in the ventral striatum.
From an applied perspective, these opponent learning pro-
cesses may bear upon our understanding of behavior in the after-
math of traumatic experiences: Stimuli associated with trauma
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onset will become aversive and motivate avoidance, while stimuli
associated with the cessation of trauma and/or the period of safety
thereafter should become attractive and motivate approach (Lohr
et al. 2007). Also, an imbalance in the processing of danger and re-
lief or safety signals may underlie pathological behavior (Lissek
et al. 2005). Therefore, understanding the neuronal mechanisms
of the respective learning processes appears warranted.
Here we examine the neuronal mechanisms of fear vs. relief
conditioning using fMRI in humans and the effects of local, tran-
sient brain inactivation on the startle response in rats. First we ask
in humans whether BOLD signals to fear- or relief-conditioned
stimuli are seen in the two structures of interest, the amygdala
and the striatum, respectively. Second, we examine in rats wheth-
er the potentiation or attenuation of the startle response due to
fear- or relief-conditioned stimuli respectively depend on intact
amygdala or striatum. Particularly, we expect a dissociation con-
firming the evolutionarily conserved requirement of the amygda-
la in conditioned fear (Davis et al. 1993; Lavond and Kim 1993;
Davis 1994; Bu¨chel et al. 1998; LaBar et al. 1998; Fendt and
Fanselow 1999; LeDoux 2000; Hamm and Weike 2005; Tabbert
et al. 2006), and here test for the first time for the requirement
of striatal circuits for conditioned relief.
Results
Neural correlates of conditioned fear and conditioned
relief in humans
Human subjects underwent either fear or relief conditioning (Fig.
1A) such that a visual CS was presented either before a mildly pain-
ful electric shock (CSSHOCK) or after the shock (SHOCKCS). Then,
event-related fMRI registered during the following test phase was
analyzed for activations by CSSHOCK and SHOCKCS as compared to
a CS that had been presented without shock during training
(CSCONTROL) or to a CS that had not been presented during training
atall (CSNOVEL).Aswe(Andreattaetal.2010)havepreviously found
that CSSHOCK potentiates startle (indicating implicit negative va-
lence),whereas SHOCKCSattenuates startle (indicating implicitpos-
itive valence), we hypothesized that fear and/or reward networks
maybeactivatedbythesestimuli, respectively,andwethereforeex-
amined the activity in amygdala and striatum as regions of interest
(ROIs).
Fear and relief conditioning caused selective activations with-
in the ROIs (Fig. 2; Table 1). Specifically, after fear conditioning
CSSHOCK activated the right amygdala more strongly compared
with both CSCONTROL (P ¼ 0.015, FWE corrected) and CSNOVEL
(P ¼ 0.016, FWE corrected), whereas after relief conditioning
SHOCKCS activated the right striatum more strongly compared with
CSCONTROL (putamen, P ¼ 0.013, FWE corrected). Furthermore,
with a lower statistical threshold (P ¼ 0.001, uncorrected), we
were able to confirm that the observed cluster of striatal activation
extended into the ventral part of the putamen (Fig. 2B), as defined
bytheMNIcoordinates(18,8,0)givenbySeymouretal. (2005),and
that the right striatal activation by the SHOCKCS was enhanced also
relative to theCSNOVEL (putamen,P, 0.001,uncorrected).Wealso
observed activation of the left insula (Fig. 2) by both CSSHOCK (P,
0.001, uncorrected) and SHOCKCS (P, 0.001, uncorrected) when
compared with CSCONTROL. Notably, we did not find anyactivation
in the amygdala, the striatum, or the insula in response to
CSCONTROL compared with CSNOVEL.
Analysis of ratings of contingency awareness confirmed that
both the fear and the relief conditioning groups discerned the
contingencies in the same way (Supplemental Fig. 1). That is,
both groups were able to correctly report the association between
the visual stimulus and the painful electric shock independent
of their relative timing during training (for statistical details
see Supplemental Material). Analysis of valence ratings revealed
that subjects considered both CSSHOCK and SHOCKCS equally
more negative than the CSCONTROL and CSNOVEL after condi-
tioning. That is, both fear and relief conditioning, despite the
implicit opponency, resulted in explicitly aversive memories
(see Supplemental Fig. 2; for statistical details, see Supplemental
Material).
Neural requirements of conditioned fear
and conditioned relief in rats
On the basis of the established rat fear-conditioning paradigm, we
first established a relief-conditioning paradigm. During learning,
we used several positive and negative ISIs between a light CS
and shock presentation. Both, using random ISIs as well as
only-CS presentations during learning, were considered to be con-
trol conditions leading to no CS-related association, allowing us
to measure a baseline of startle magnitude in the presence of a
“neutral” CS. An overall analysis revealed significant effects of
the different ISIs in the learning phase (Kruskal-Wallis test: H ¼
68.46, P, 0.001). As depicted in Figure 3A, we observed a weak,
nonsignificant attenuation of the startle magnitude by the light
cue in the two control conditions (Wilcoxon Signed Rank test;
Figure 1. Experimental design. (A) Human imaging experiment.
Participants either underwent fear conditioning, in which a geometrical
shape (CSSHOCK, e.g., circle) was presented before the shock and thus
was to be associated with shock-onset, or relief conditioning, in which a
shape (SHOCKCS) was presented after the shock, to be associated with
shock-offset; such training endows the CSSHOCK and the SHOCKCS with
the capacity to respectively potentiate or attenuate startle in humans
(Andreatta et al. 2010). In both cases, another shape (CSCONTROL, e.g.,
square) was presented alone, thus not to be associated with shock. In
the test, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was used to
monitor brain activity in response to CSSHOCK and CSCONTROL in the
case of fear conditioning and to SHOCKCS and CSCONTROL in the case of
relief conditioning. Additionally, a third shape (CSNOVEL, e.g., a triangle),
which had never been presented before, was displayed and fMRI activa-
tions recorded. (B) Rat lesion experiments. Day 1: All rats were acclima-
tized to the startle apparatus for 5 min by delivering 10 startle probe
stimuli (i.e., loud noise) at intervals of 30 sec. Day 2: Either the rats under-
went fear conditioning, in which a 5-sec light (CSSHOCK) was associated
with shock-onset, or they underwent relief conditioning, in which the
light (SHOCKCS) was presented after shock-offset. Day 3: Test for condi-
tioned fear or conditioned relief: Startle probe stimuli were delivered in
either the presence or absence of the light CS, with the indicated inacti-
vation regimen applied.
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comparison with zero: only CS, P ¼ 0.08; rnd, P ¼ 0.57), which
were pooled for further analyses (stippled line in Fig. 3A).
Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with this pooled control group re-
vealed a significant attenuation of the startle magnitude after re-
lief conditioning (ISI: 23 sec; Dunn’s test: P, 0.01). After
“normal” fear conditioning (ISI: +4.5 sec), on the other hand,
the CS, as expected, potentiated startle (P, 0.01). Yet longer pos-
itive (≥12 sec) or negative (≥6 sec) ISIs were without significant
effect on startle magnitude. Accordingly, for the next experiment,
we chose the ISIs of +4.5 sec for fear conditioning and 23 sec for
relief conditioning. These ISIs induced robust and stable startle
potentiation and attenuation, respectively (Fig. 3B,C).
To test whether the amygdala or the ventral striatum (i.e., nu-
cleus accumbens) is required for the expression of fear or relief
conditioning, we acutely inactivated these areas by local injec-
tions of muscimol after the respective training, before the retrieval
test (Fig. 1B; for injection sites see Supplemental Fig. 3). Muscimol
is a GABA-A receptor agonist and leads to a local and transient in-
hibition of neural activity (Martin 1991). We found that the mus-
cimol effect on fear conditioning depended on the injection site
(Fig. 4) (ANOVA, Site × Treatment: F(1,13) ¼ 7.78, P ¼ 0.02).
Fear-potentiated startle was blocked by acute inactivation of the
basolateral amygdala (post-hoc comparison vehicle vs. muscimol:
t ¼ 3.19, P ¼ 0.02) but not by inactivation of the ventral striatum
(t ¼ 20.93, P ¼ 0.39). Notably, after relief conditioning (Fig. 4),
the effect of muscimol also depended on injection site (ANOVA,
Site × Treatment: F(1,16) ¼ 4.93, P ¼ 0.04). In this case, however,
muscimol injections into the amygdala were benign (t ¼ 20.90,
P ¼ 0.40), whereas acute inactivation of the ventral striatum abol-
ished startle attenuation by the SHOCKCS (t ¼ 23.71, P ¼ 0.006).
Discussion
We studied the mnemonic effects of shock-onset and shock-offset
using comparable conditioning paradigms in rats and humans.
Critically, these paradigms allow assaying opponently valenced
memories formed by the conditioned stimuli directly, namely, by
assessing the bidirectional modulation in response to these stimuli
(e.g., increasing or decreasing startle amplitude) rather than by in-
direct tests (e.g., retardation of acquisition, summation). Using
such an assay, we demonstrated by fMRI in humans that stimuli as-
sociated with the onset or the offset of the same shock episode, re-
spectively, entail activations of the amygdala, which is crucially
involved in fear learning and fear expression (Phelps and LeDoux
2005), or of the striatum, which is particularly involved in process-
ingof rewardingevents (DelgadoandDickerson2012).Then,using
rats, we asked whether the respective brain areas are also required
for the expression of the corresponding conditioned behaviors.
To do so, we first supplemented the existing rat fear-conditioning
paradigms (Davis et al. 1993; Fendt and Fanselow 1999) with a
relief-conditioning protocol. Then we showed that temporary in-
activation of the amygdala and the striatum selectively interfere
with conditioned fear and conditioned relief, respectively.
Thus, both in human and in rat the associative processes re-
lated to the onset and the offset of an aversive event are mediated
by different neural substrates. The offset of shock supports con-
ditioned relief, which shares a neuro-
nal signature with conditioned reward
(Robbins and Everitt 1996; Gottfried
et al. 2002) in that activation of the stria-
tum is observed (Figs. 2B, 4). The onset of
shock, in turn, supports fear condition-
ing, which shows a complementary neu-
ronal signature in that activation of the
amygdala but not the striatum is re-
quired (Figs. 2, 4; see also Davis 1994;
LaBar et al. 1998; Fendt and Fanselow
1999). Thus, shifting the stimulus pre-
sentation by only a few seconds has dras-
tic consequences, both on the behavioral
(Andreatta et al. 2010) and on the neuro-
nal level (present study). Stimuli paired
with one and the same aversive event
can induce memories with qualitatively
different behavioral valence, dependent
Figure 2. Specific brain activations after fear and relief conditioning. (A)
A fear-conditioned visual stimulus, CSSHOCK, associated with the onset of a
mildly aversive electric shock, induced strong activation of the right amyg-
dala (MNI coordinates; peak voxel: 232, 0, 220, Z ¼ 3.53, P ¼ 0.015),
but not of the striatum. (B) A relief-conditioned visual stimulus,
SHOCKCS, associated with the offset of a mildly aversive electric shock,
induced strong activation of the right striatum (MNI coordinates, peak
voxel: 28, 14, 2 [putamen], Z ¼ 4.09, P ¼ 0.013), but not of the amygda-
la; striatum activation extended to the ventral striatum (ventral part of the
putamen; coordinates 18, 8, 0). (A, B) Both CSSHOCK and SHOCKCS trig-
gered left insula activity (peak voxel: 236, 4, 4, Z ¼ 3.62, P, 0.001).
Displayed are BOLD responses triggered by CSSHOCK or SHOCKCS minus re-
sponses triggered by a stimulus not associated with the shock
(CSCONTROL). For display, the threshold for activation was set at P,
0.005 (uncorrected).
Table 1. Coordinates and statistics for the human imaging study
ROI x y Z Z-value P-value
Fear conditioning group
CSSHOCK vs. CSCONTROL Right amygdala 32 0 220 3.53 0.015a
Left insula 234 16 216 3.35 0.001b
CSSHOCK vs. CSNOVEL Right amygdala 32 0 230 3.49 0.016a
Relief conditioning group
SHOCKCS vs. CSCONTROL Right striatum 28 14 2 4.09 0.013a
Left insula 236 4 4 3.62 0.001b
SHOCKCS vs. CSNOVEL Right striatum 24 14 4 3.70 0.001b
aFWE corrected
bUncorrected
The coordinates of the voxels refer to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI). Notably, no significant ac-
tivation has been found to the reverse contrasts: CSCONTROL vs. CSSHOCK, CSCONTROL vs. SHOCKCS, and
CSCONTROL vs. NOVELCS.
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on whether they precede or follow the event. In the first case, fear
networks are activated and startle amplitude is increased, whereas
in the second case, reward networks are activated and startle is
decreased.
Negative emotions, both in humans (Bu¨chel et al. 1998; LaBar
et al. 1998; Hamm and Weike 2005) and in rodents (Rogan et al.
1997; Herry et al. 2008; Ciocchi et al. 2010), are accompanied by
activation of the amygdala. If an initially neutral stimulus coin-
cides with such amygdaloid activation (as is the case in fear condi-
tioning) (Fig. 2A) the sensory pathway to the basolateral amygdala
is modified (Rogan et al. 1997; Maren 2000) such that when the
stimulus is presented again, the amygdala will be activated. This
activation produces symptomsof conditioned fear such as a poten-
tiation of the startle response (Fendt and Fanselow 1999; Phelps
and LeDoux 2005; Grillon 2008). Indeed, fear conditioning is at-
tenuated or blocked in human patients with selective amygdala
damage (Bechara et al. 1995; Siebert et al. 2003) and in animals
with inactivated or lesioned amygdala (Fig. 4; Hitchcock and
Davis 1986; Helmstetter and Bellgowan 1994; Muller et al. 1997).
Accordingly, we find that amygdala is recruited by and required
for conditioned fear (Figs. 2, 4).
As for the emotional state induced by the offset of an aversive
event, we find reward-like behavioral effects—that is, conditioned
attenuation of startle, both in rats (Figs. 2B, 4) and in humans
(Andreatta et al. 2010; for related results in flies, see Tanimoto
et al. 2004; Yarali et al. 2008). Importantly, such conditioned relief
recruits and depends on the striatum, particularly its ventral part
(Figs. 2, 4). Dopaminergic neurons projecting to the ventral stria-
tum are activated by reward (Robbins and Everitt 1996; Schultz
et al. 1997; Delgado 2007; Wang and Tsien 2011; Delgado and
Dickerson 2012) as well as by the reduction or omission of a pain-
ful event (Seymour et al. 2005; Becerra and Borsook 2008;
Brischoux et al. 2009; Leknes et al. 2011), suggesting an overlap
between reward- and relief-related responses. Stimuli presented
during reward-induced striatal excitation acquire positive condi-
tioned valence (Jay 2003), as reflected by attenuation of the startle
reflex (Schmidt et al. 1995) or the conditioned activation of the
ventral striatum (Gottfried et al. 2002). In rats, activity of the ven-
tral striatum is indeed sufficient (Schwienbacher et al. 2006) and
necessary (Koch et al. 1996) for startle attenuation by a positively
valenced cue. Together with these previous studies, our findings
that conditioned relief activates the ventral striatum (Fig. 2B)
and that acute inactivation of the ventral striatum blocks startle
attenuation by conditioned relief (Fig. 4) point to shared behavio-
ral and neural signatures between conditioned relief and reward.
It should be interesting to see at which stage of processing this
isomorphism breaks down, and how the range of effects of relief-
Figure 3. Fear vs. relief conditioning results in potentiation vs. attenua-
tion of startle in rats. During conditioning, 15 pairings of a light stimulus
with an electric footshock were presented. Different interstimulus intervals
(ISI) were used in the different groups (n ¼ 12–16/group): positive ISI for
fear conditioning and negative ISI for relief conditioning. One day later,
the modulating effects of the learned light stimulus on auditory startle
was tested. (A) Effects of different ISI. A light stimulus never (CS only) or ran-
domly (rnd) paired with a footshock did not affect the startle magnitude
and served as control groups (median after pooling: hatched line). After
normal fear conditioning (ISI: +4.5 sec), the learned light stimulus signifi-
cantly potentiated the startle magnitude (displayed are medians, 25% and
75% quartiles and 10% and 90% quantiles of percent changes of the startle
magnitude), whereas after relief conditioning (ISI: +3 sec) a significant at-
tenuation of the startle magnitude was observed. (∗∗) P, 0.01, Dunn’s
post-hoc test after main significant effects in a Kruskal-Wallis test. Means
(B) and time courses (C) of mean startle magnitude (+SEM) in the
absence (black bars; filled circles) and the presence of the light (white
bars; open circles), as well as the difference (hatched bars) for the groups
with ISIs of +4.5 sec and 23 sec, and the control groups. Figure 4. Specific neuronal requirements of conditioned relief and con-
ditioned fear. After training and 15 min before probing for the modula-
tion of startle by the learned light stimulus, animals received injections of
either saline or muscimol. Muscimol injections lead to a local and transient
neural inactivation by activating GABA-A receptors. The effects of fear
conditioning were blocked by injections into the basolateral amygdala
(BLA, n ¼ 8), but not by injections into the ventral striatum (vSTR; n ¼
7). In contrast, effects of relief conditioning were reduced by injections
into the vSTR (n ¼ 9), but not by injections into the BLA (n ¼ 9). (∗) P,
0.05, (∗∗) P , 0.01, paired t-test (Bonferroni corrected) after significant
ANOVA effects.
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conditioned stimuli—in particular regarding explicit value judg-
ments in humans (see next section) and safety-seeking and explo-
ration behavior in rodents (Rogan et al. 2005)—compares with the
kinds of effect supported by reward-associated stimuli.
It is well established in the literature that the amygdala has a
prominent role in fear-related responses, as it is for the dopami-
nergic projections to the striatum in reward-related responses.
However, more recent studies indicate that the amygdala may
also be involved in coding rewarding stimuli (Paton et al. 2006;
Belova et al. 2007; Murray 2007; Calu et al. 2010) and that the
striatum may also be involved in coding aversive events (Jensen
et al. 2003; Delgado et al. 2008; Kluchen et al. 2009; Levita et al.
2009; Mechias et al. 2010). On the one hand, the reward-related
activation in the amygdala has been circumscribed to only some
neurons (Paton et al. 2006; Belova et al. 2007; Murray 2007), sug-
gesting that the amygdala processes rewards and threats in two
different ways (LeDoux 2012). More importantly, the amygdala
has been implicated in coding the expectation of biologically sa-
lient events, either aversive or appetitive (Belova et al. 2007; Li
et al. 2011). Therefore, the amygdala activation in response to
the CSSHOCK in our study suggests that fear-related responses
may be due to the expectation of the painful shock. On the other
hand, the threat-related activation in the striatum has been cir-
cumscribed to the learning phase only, i.e., to the conditioning it-
self (Jensen et al. 2003; Delgado et al. 2008; Kluchen et al. 2009;
Mechias et al. 2010; Li et al. 2011). Since this study examined stria-
tal activation only after conditioning, i.e., during the test phase,
we are reluctant to interpret the observed striatum activation as
threat-related (Jensen et al. 2003; Kluchen et al. 2009).
Despite the opposing effects of fear and relief conditioning in
terms of implicit valence (i.e., startle amplitude modulation, brain
activity), humans explicitly judge relief-conditioned stimuli as
“emotionally negative” (Andreatta et al. 2010; Supplemental
Fig. 2). This rift between explicit and implicit responses supports
dual-process theories (e.g., Strack and Deutsch 2004; Bechara and
Damasio 2005), which suggest that human behavior is induced
by the synergistic or antagonist work of an impulsive system and
a reflective system. The former is based on implicit associative pro-
cesses, the latter on explicit cognitive processes. In this context, we
note that both fear- and relief-conditioned stimuli activate the
insula (Fig.2).The insulahasbeenproposedtobeaneural substrate
for the integration of sensory and cognitive-motivational afferent
inputs (Craig2002,2009;Mechiasetal.2010). It is thustemptingto
speculate that the insula may be involved in the generation of ex-
plicit emotional judgments.
Throughout this study, we presented our results within the
framework of the opponent-process theory of acquired motiva-
tion (Solomon 1980; Wagner 1981), proposing two processes in-
duced by one and the same aversive event: an immediate and
negative emotional state triggered by the aversive event’s onset
and a delayed and positive emotional state triggered by the
offset of the aversive event. A possible alternative interpretation
would be that the SHOCKCS comes to signal a following period
of safety until the delivery of the shock in the subsequent train-
ing trial (Sutton and Barto 1990; Chang et al. 2003), and such
safety conditioning shares neural bases with reward conditioning
(Rogan et al. 2005; Leknes et al. 2011). In fact, in the present
rat paradigm, the weak startle attenuation after training with
long ISIs (Fig. 3A) could be interpreted as such. However, we
consider this less likely with respect to the relevant SHOCKCS
since we find the conditioned modulation of the startle response
amplitude to not depend on the duration of such a safety-period
in a trivial way (see also Introduction). Rather, at least in the
rat, the conditioned relief response was only established using
a very short negative ISI (Fig. 3A), arguing for a “relief”-based
explanation.
However, we have to admit that we cannot unequivocally
conclude that the SHOCKCS-triggered striatal activity in our human
participants is due to an association of the SHOCKCS with relief, es-
pecially since our participants explicitly rated SHOCKCS as nega-
tively as CSSHOCK and we did not measure the implicit valence,
e.g., by modulation of the startle response. However, we can infer
relief, based on our past observation of startle attenuation by the
SHOCKCS (Andreatta et al. 2010). This previous experiment was not
done in an fMRI scanner and thus may not optimally compare
with our present experiments; however, we note that the scanner
environment likely does not considerably change startle modula-
tion (Anders et al. 2004).
In any case, we think that our results can help to understand
some features of odd and/or pathological behavior. For ex-
ample, “having survived” a roller-coaster ride or extreme sports
may support relief conditioning and thus explain the attraction
to such dangerous activities (Wang and Tsien 2011). In the same
vein, the relief experienced by a hostage following acute repeated
death threats may help explain the development of positive
behavior toward the hostage taker. Relief conditioning may also
contribute to the attraction of anxiety patients to stimuli associat-
ed with fear-offset such as medication, the hospital, or therapy
environment, and may likewise explain why items not plausibly
related to but temporally linked with fear-offset can become “fear-
fighting” talismans. Similar scenarios may apply regarding the
offset of panic attacks and the safety-seeking behavior that may
emerge (Himadi 1987; Lohr et al. 2007). Further, hypervigilance
to signals of upcoming threats (Bishop 2007) together with a
deficit in perception or learning of threat-offset signals may
turn a bad experience into a mnemonically unbearable one, and
thus contribute to post-traumatic stress (PTSD) or panic disorders
(Mineka and Oehlberg 2008; Jovanovic et al. 2010). We noted
that, in flies at least, memories after fear conditioning are tempo-
rally less stable than memories after relief conditioning (see Fig. 7
in Yarali et al. 2008); if this were the case in humans too, the conse-
quences of degraded relief learning may surface with delay, consis-
tent with the incubation often observed for PTSD symptoms
(Bonne et al. 2004). In any event, our results prompt us to consider
the role of relief conditioning in the development and mainte-
nance of exaggerated risk taking, excessive safety seeking, post-
traumatic stress, and panic disorders, including the question of
whether the chosen therapy is differentially effective for fear and
relief memories, or not.
Materials and Methods
Human imaging study
Participants
A total of 28 right-handed volunteers (15 female; mean age ¼
22.68 yr; SD ¼ 2.72; range ¼ 19–29) free of neurological, psy-
chiatric, and chronic pain disorders and acute pain medica-
tion gave informed consent and were randomly assigned to
the fear (n ¼ 14) or the relief (n ¼ 14) conditioning group. The
study was approved by the ethics committee of the German
Society of Psychology (Deutsche Gesellschaft fu¨r Psychologie,
DGPs).
Stimuli and pre-experimental setup
Theunconditioned aversive stimulus (US) was a 200-msec-long cu-
taneous electric pulse stimulation at 50 Hz, applied to the left in-
dex finger via surface bar electrodes consisting of two durable
gold-pasted stainless-steel disk electrodes with 9 mm diameter,
30 mm spacing, and an impedance of 5V. Stimulation was gener-
ated by a constant-current stimulator (Digitimer DS7A) supplying
a maximum of 400 V and 10 mA. The intensity of the US was
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individually adjusted before the experiment with a pain threshold
procedure consisting of two series of electrical stimuli of ascending
and descending intensities (steps of 0.5 mA) (Reiff et al. 1999).
Participants evaluated the intensity of each stimulus on a scale
ranging from 0 (no pain at all) across 4 (just noticeable pain) to
10 (unbearable pain). The individually adjusted US was defined
as the mean of the intensities rated as “just noticeable pain” (i.e.,
4) plus 1 mA. Groups did not differ regarding the intensity of the
electric shock thus determined (F(1,26) ¼ 1.80, P ¼ 0.191).
The conditioned stimuli (CS) were geometric shapes (a
square, a circle, and a triangle) of solid yellow color with identical
luminance displayed for 10 sec on a black background via MRI-
compatible goggles (VisuaStim, Magnetic Resonance Technolo-
gies) using the software Presentation 11.1 (Oracle).
Experimental procedure
Before starting the experiment, participants completed the
German version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Laux et al.
1981) (groups did not differ: F(1,26) ¼ 0.001, P ¼ 0.975) and the
pain threshold assessment. Then, in the scanner, participants first
underwent an anatomical scan in the absence of any stimulation.
The experiment then consisted of two phases: learning and test
(see Fig. 1A) following the design of Andreatta et al. (2010).
Both experimental groups completed a differential condi-
tioning procedure, which only differed in the temporal sequence
of CS onset and US onset (interstimulus interval; ISI). In the fear-
conditioning group the CSSHOCK started 10 sec before US onset
(ISI ¼ 10 sec), while the CSCONTROL was not paired with the US.
In the relief-conditioning group, the SHOCKCS started 6 sec after
US onset (ISI ¼ 26 sec), while the CSCONTROL was not paired
with the US. Both groups completed 32 conditioning trials, 16
presentations of either CSSHOCK or SHOCKCS, plus 16 presentations
of CSCONTROL. Stimuli were presented in a pseudo-randomized or-
der, that is, the same stimulus was never presented more than
twice in a row. The intertrial interval (ITI; i.e., the interval be-
tween the offset of the last stimulus of one trial and the onset of
the first stimulus of the following trial) was 20 sec. After condi-
tioning, all participants went through 30 test trials during which
the crucial fMRI measurement took place: 10 trials with either
CSSHOCK or SHOCKCS presentation, 10 trials with CSCONTROL pre-
sentation, and 10 trials with presentations of a novel visual stim-
ulus (CSNOVEL) that had not been presented during conditioning.
Before and after the experiment, participants were asked to
rate the valence and the arousal of the CSs as well as the contin-
gency between the CSs and the US (see Supplemental Materials
for methods and most results).
Magnetic resonance imaging
Brain images were acquired using a 1.5-T MR scanner (Avanto
1.5T, Siemens) with a standard head coil. The structural-image ac-
quisition consisted of 160 T1-weighted sagittal magnetization-
prepared rapid gradient-echo imaging (MP-RAGE) 3D MRI se-
quences (MPRAGE, 1-mm slice thickness, TR ¼ 2250 msec, TE ¼
3.93 msec, 8˚ flip angle, FOV ¼ 250 mm, matrix ¼ 256 × 256,
voxel size ¼ 1 × 1 × 1 mm). For functional imaging, a total of
940 volumes for the fear conditioning group and a total of 1004
volumes for the relief conditioning group were registered using
a T∗2-weighted gradient echo-planar imaging sequence (EPI)
with 25 axial slices parallel to the AC–PC line and covering the
whole brain (5-mm slice thickness; 1-mm gap, descending order,
TA ¼ 100 msec; TE ¼ 40 msec, TR ¼ 2500 msec, flip angle ¼ 90˚,
field of view¼ 240 × 240 mm, matrix size ¼ 64 × 64, voxel
size ¼ 3.1 × 3.1 × 5 mm).
Data analysis
fMRI data were analyzed using Statistical Parametric Mapping
(SPM5, Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology) in
MatLab 7.0 (Mathworks, Inc.). Realignment (b-spline interpola-
tion) and slice time corrections were performed (Ashburner and
Friston 2003). To allow localization of functional activation on
the participants’ structural MRIs, T1-scans were coregistered to
each participant’s mean image of the realigned functional images.
Coregistered T1 images were then segmented, and in the next
step EPI images were spatially normalized into the Montreal
Neurological Institute (MNI)spaceusingthenormalizationparam-
etersobtainedfromthesegmentationprocedure(voxelsize2 × 2 ×
2 mm3) and spatially smoothed with an 8-mm full-width half-
maximum(FWHM)Gaussiankernel.Theexperimental conditions
were modeled by convolving stick functions with the canonical
hemodynamicresponsefunction(HRF).Thesixmovementparam-
eters of the rigid body transformation were introduced as covari-
ates. The voxel-based time series were filtered with a high-pass
filter (128-sec time constant). In order to prevent specific processes
implicated by extinction, we considered activations in response to
the visual stimuli during the early test trials (LaBar et al. 1998), that
is, the first five presentations of CSSHOCK or SHOCKCS, CSCONTROL
and CSNOVEL. For each participant, t-contrasts (fear conditioning
group: CSSHOCK. CSCONTROL, CSSHOCK . CSNOVEL; relief condi-
tioning group: SHOCKCS. CSCONTROL, SHOCKCS. CSNOVEL) were
computed. For a priori expected activations, Region of Interest
(ROI) analyses were carried out for amygdala, striatum, insula,
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)
on masks from WFU Pickatlas software (Version 2.4, Wake Forest
University, School of Medicine), and separately for the two hemi-
spheres. We expected effects, especially in the right hemisphere,
since the right amygdala was reported to be particularly and more
strongly involved in conditioning involving sensorial aversive
stimuli (Phelps et al. 2004; Kluchen et al. 2009; Mechias et al.
2010), while the left amygdalahas beenproposed tobe particularly
involvedin instructedfearand linkedtoverbalandabstractedaver-
sive information (Phelps et al. 2004; Mechias et al. 2010).We also
performedseparatedROIanalysis for the left and the right striatum
because we particularly expected the right striatum to be involved
in the processing of secondary reinforcers (Seymour et al. 2007;
Delgado et al. 2008). For all analyses, a minimum cluster size of
five voxels was required (Tabbert et al. 2006). The statistical thresh-
old foractivationwassetatP, 0.05(correctedfor familywiseerror,
FWE). However, in order to reveal further activations, we set the
statistical threshold at P, 0.001 (uncorrected) for the insula and
a detailed striatum analysis (Schiller et al. 2009).
Rat studies
Animals
Male Sprague Dawley rats (200–350 g) were housed in groups of
four under standard conditions under a 12-h:12-h light:dark cycle
(lights on at 7:00); food and water were available ad libitum. All
experiments were carried out during the light phase, performed
in accordance with international ethical guidelines for the use
of animals in experiments, and were approved by the Basel City
Cantonal Veterinary Authority.
Apparatus
A startle system with eight chambers (35 cm × 35 cm × 38 cm)
was used (SR-LAB, San Diego Instruments). Each chamber con-
tained a small animal enclosure made of a transparent horizontal
Plexiglas cylinder with a 9-cm inner diameter and a 16-cm inner
length. Movements of the animals were detected by motion-
sensitive transducers mounted underneath the cylinders. For
data acquisition the output signal of the transducers was digitized
(sampling rate: 1 kHz) and stored on a computer. Stored responses
were expressed in arbitrary units. For conditioning, electric foot-
shocks (US) and light stimuli (CS) were used. The light stimulus
(duration: 5 sec) was presented to the animals with 20 W bulbs
(700 lux) mounted to the back of the test chambers. Scrambled
footshocks were administered by a floor grid (six parallel bars,
10 mm apart, and 5 mm diameter) and had an intensity of
0.8 mA and a duration of 0.5 sec. White background noise (50 dB
SPL) andthe acoustic startleprobe (40 msec,96 dB SPL whitenoise)
were generated by high-frequency loudspeakers mounted in the
center of the ceiling of the test chambers.
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Establishing relief conditioning in rats
Behavioral procedure
On the first day (startle baseline), the animals were put into the
startle apparatus, and after 5 min acclimatization 10 startle probe
stimuli with an intertrial interval of 30 sec were delivered. Then,
animals were brought back into their home cages. Animals were
then allocated into groups to yield similar mean baseline startle
magnitudes.
On the second day (conditioning), the animals were condi-
tioned. After an acclimatization period of 5 min, 15 pairings of a
5-sec light stimulus with an electric-shock stimulus were delivered
with a mean intertrial interval of 150 sec (range: 90–210 sec).
There were eight different groups with 12–16 animals each; for
each group, different interstimulus intervals (onset–onset ISI) be-
tween the light stimulus (conditioned stimulus: CS) and the elec-
tric footshock (unconditioned stimulus: US) were used: 260 sec,
230 sec, 212 sec, 26 sec, 23 sec, +4.5 sec, +12 sec, and +30
sec. Positive ISIs mean that the light stimulus is presented before
the shock, negative ISIs mean that the light stimulus is presented
after the shock. Two further groups were exposed to conditions
that should not lead to any associations with the CS: In one group
(“only CS”), the CS was presented without any US, in the other
group (“rnd” ¼ random), random ISIs between CS and US were
used. No startle probes were presented during the conditioning
session.
On the third day (retention test), the rats were tested for the
magnitude of the startle reflex, either in the presence or absence of
the learned light stimulus. Animals were put into the startle appa-
ratus, and after 5 min of accommodation 10 startle stimuli were
administered to habituate the startle response. Then 20 further
startle stimuli were presented, half of them in the absence and
half of them in the presence of the learned light stimulus (in a
pseudorandomized order; intertrial interval: 30 sec). For each an-
imal, we calculated the mean startle magnitude in the absence
(Startle alone) and in the presence of the learned light stimulus
(CS-startle), as well as the percent difference between these means.
Statistical analyses
For each group of animals, the mean percent startle difference was
calculated. Since the data were not normally distributed, nonpara-
metric tests were used for statistical analysis: Wilcoxon Signed
Rank tests for comparison with zero, the Kruskal-Wallis test for
comparison across the different groups, and the Dunn’s multiple
comparison test for post-hoc comparisons.
The effects of temporary inactivation of the amygdala or
ventral striatum on conditioned relief and conditioned fear
Surgery
Rats were anesthetized with 1%–3% isoflurane and placed into a
stereotaxic frame. The skull was exposed and stainless-steel guide
cannulae (22G, length: 6.0 mm) were bilaterally implanted, aim-
ing at either the basolateral amygdala (3.3 mm caudal and
+5.1 mm lateral from Bregma, 9.0 mm ventral from skull) or
the ventral striatum (1.2 mm rostral and +2.25 mm lateral from
Bregma, 28.0 mm ventral from skull). The guide cannulae were
fixed to the skull with dental cement and two to three anchoring
screws. To prevent post-surgery pain, the analgesic buprenorphin
(0.05 mg/kg, i.p.) was administered twice per day on the first 2 d
following surgery. Behavioral tests started following full recovery
(5–6 d after surgery).
Behavioral procedure
The same behavioral procedures were used as specified above, us-
ing an ISI of 23 sec for relief conditioning and an ISI of +4.5 sec
for fear conditioning (see Fig. 1B). However, immediately before
the test on the third day (retention test), the rats were gently re-
strained by the experimenter and 28G injectors, connected to
Hamilton syringes by tubes, were introduced into the guide can-
nulae. A total volume of 0.3 mL solution with either saline or mus-
cimol (0.25 mg, Sigma-Aldrich) was then injected at a flow rate of
0.1 mL/min, controlled by a microinfusion pump (CMA100,
CMA). The injector was removed after an additional 60 sec.
Animals were then put into the startle apparatus, and after
5 min of accommodation 10 startle stimuli were administered to
habituate the startle response. Then 20 further startle stimuli
were presented, half of them in the absence and half of them in
the presence of the learned light stimulus (in a pseudorandomized
order; intertrial interval: 30 sec). For each animal, the mean startle
magnitude of the startle trials in the absence (Startle alone) and in
the presence of the learned light stimulus (CS-startle), as well as
the percent difference between these means were calculated.
On the next day, a reconditioning was performed (i.e., seven
pairings of the stimulus and footshock at the groups’ respective
ISI). Yet 1 d later, animals received injections and were tested
once more in the same manner as on day 3; however, animals
that had received saline on day 3 were injected with muscimol
this time, and animals that had received muscimol on day 3
were injected with saline.
After the final behavior test, all rats were sacrificed. For the
verification of the injection sites, the brains were removed and
immersion-fixed with 4% formaldehyde, 30% sucrose. Frontal
sections (100 mm) were cut on a freezing microtome and counter-
stained with cresyl violet. The injection sites were localized and
the extent of tissue lesions due to cannulation was examined un-
der a light microscope. The injection sites were confirmed by com-
parison with plates taken from a rat brain atlas (Paxinos and
Watson 1997). Animals with misplaced injections or lesions or
bleedings in the area of the injection were excluded from further
analyses (12 out of a total of 45 animals).
Statistical analyses
The mean percent changes in the startle magnitude were calculat-
ed for each group. To determine the effects of muscimol injections
into the basolateral amygdala and the nucleus accumbens, a mul-
tifactorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed for both
fear and relief conditioning. Treatment (saline, muscimol) was
used as a within-subject factor, whereas brain site (basolateral
amygdala, ventral striatum) was used as a between-subject factor.
For post-hoc comparisons, paired t-tests with Bonferroni correc-
tions were used.
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